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About 
 
Shortly after the end of the Kosovo war, the last of the Yugoslav dissolution wars, the
Balkan Reconstruction Observatory was set up jointly by the Hellenic Observatory, the
Centre for the Study of Global Governance, both institutes at the London School of
Economics (LSE), and the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw).
A brainstorming meeting on Reconstruction and Regional Co-operation in the Balkans
was held in Vouliagmeni on 8-10  July 1999, covering the issues of security,
democratisation, economic reconstruction and the role of civil society. It was attended
by academics and policy makers from all the countries in the region, from a number of
EU countries, from the European Commission, the USA and Russia. Based on ideas and
discussions generated at this meeting, a policy paper on Balkan Reconstruction and
European Integration was the product of a collaborative effort by the two LSE institutes
and the wiiw. The paper was presented at a follow-up meeting on Reconstruction and
Integration in Southeast Europe in Vienna on 12-13 November 1999, which focused on
the economic aspects of the process of reconstruction in the Balkans. It is this policy
paper that became the very first Working Paper of the wiiw Balkan Observatory
Working Papers series. The Working Papers are published online at www.balkan-
observatory.net, the internet portal of the wiiw Balkan Observatory. It is a portal for
research and communication in relation to economic developments in Southeast Europe
maintained by the wiiw since 1999. Since 2000 it also serves as a forum for the Global
Development Network Southeast Europe (GDN-SEE) project, which is based on an
initiative by The World Bank with financial support from the Austrian Ministry of
Finance and the Oesterreichische Nationalbank. The purpose of the GDN-SEE project
is the creation of research networks throughout Southeast Europe in order to enhance
the economic research capacity in Southeast Europe, to build new research capacities by
mobilising young researchers, to promote knowledge transfer into the region, to
facilitate networking between researchers within the region, and to assist in securing
knowledge transfer from researchers to policy makers. The wiiw Balkan Observatory
Working Papers series is one way to achieve these objectives. 
The wiiw Balkan Observatory Global Development Network 
Southeast Europe 
This study has been developed in the framework of research networks initiated and monitored by wiiw
under the premises of the GDN–SEE partnership. 
 
 
The Global Development Network, initiated by The World Bank, is a global network of
research and policy institutes working together to address the problems of national and
regional development. It promotes the generation of local knowledge in developing and
transition countries and aims at building research capacities in the different regions.  
 
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies is a GDN Partner Institute and
acts as a hub for Southeast Europe. The GDN–wiiw partnership aims to support the
enhancement of economic research capacity in Southeast Europe, to promote
knowledge transfer to SEE, to facilitate networking among researchers within SEE and
to assist in securing knowledge transfer from researchers to policy makers. 
 
The GDN–SEE programme is financed by the Global Development Network, the
Austrian Ministry of Finance and the Jubiläumsfonds der Oesterreichischen
Nationalbank.  
 
For additional information see www.balkan-observatory.net, www.wiiw.ac.at and
www.gdnet.org 
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0. Introduction 
 
The question of the trade regime for Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) has during the 
last decade been the subject of an intense discussion amongst the policymakers and academia from 
both within the region and from the EU. The main issues around which the discussion has 
concentrated were those of enhancing the catching-up process by the means of trade liberalization, and 
protection of the “sensitive” industries within the EU.  
 
Regarding the design of the trade regime for the South-East European (SEE) countries
2, the issue of 
the speed of their accession towards the EU, and/or regional approach has added a new component to 
the discussion. Although the EU has recently engaged into the asymmetric trade liberalization with 
respect to the region ("Western Balkans"), that policy has an expiry date at the beginning of 2003. By 
that time it should become clearer what the design of the trade policy between these countries and 
towards the EU, as its main trading partner, will look like.  
 
The current discussion has not been very insightful with respect to the “hard facts” on the present level 
of integration within the region and its relationship with the EU. An obvious fact is that all countries 
have in one way or the other been excluded from international trade integration during the nineties. 
Also, it is obvious that the region is an economic dwarf, which makes any serious competitive threat to 
the EU highly unlikely. 
  
In this paper we first present some stylized facts on the Croatian trade, and the SEE trade. Second, we 
analyze the level of trade integration within the region, using the simple tools as trade openness ratio 
and trade concentration indices. We try to explain why the trade development in Croatia did not 
observe the canonical transitional behavior. Then we run a single country gravity model in order to get 
more insight into the trade potential of Croatia. Three scenarios are calibrated in order to determine 
trade potential of Croatia with respect to the SEE, EU and CEFTA countries. We also run gravity 
regressions by sector, which are supposed to reveal which sectors have highest trade potential, and 
look at the link between the trade and FDIs.  Finally, we discuss the "right" design of the trade regime 
for Croatia and SEE. 
 
 
1. Trade and Transition: The Forces at Work 
 
A typical transition country can be described as a small and open economy often with a newly 
(re)gained independence. Croatia, indeed, fits quite well into this definition. At the onset of transition, 
                                                                 
2 SEE countries are here defined as Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Yugoslavia, Macedonia and Albania, i.e. 
"trade isolated" countries that were neither the EU candidate countries nor CEFTA members.   3
three distinct forces were shaping the trade pattern of a typical transition country. First was a collapse 
of the CMEA. Another contribution to a new economic geography was a dissolution of supranational 
states like the USSR, Czech Republic and Yugoslavia. Third was an increase in trade openness ratio 
(TOR) as a consequence of the policies of stabilization, liberalization and privatization. 
 
1.  Although former Yugoslavia was not a member of the CMEA, its collapse, which accompanied 
the fall of the Iron curtain, led to a diversion of excess trade with that block. Havrylyshyn and Pritchett 
(1991) suggest, on a basis of an estimated gravity equations, that during the period 1980-1982 
Yugoslavian trade with the CEEC’s exceeded the “natural” by 13 percentage points of the total trade. 
At the same time, trade with Northern Europe fell short of “natural” trade by 18 percentage points. 
This was fairly small in comparison with their estimates of trade reorientation needed in other 
CEEC’s. For example, it was estimated that Czechoslovakia needed trade reorientation accounting for 
more than 70 per cent of its total trade. Based again on a gravity approach, Wang and Winters (1994) 
draw somewhat different conclusion for the year 1985. Although intra-CMEA trade, according to their 
estimates, broadly matched the potential, trade with market economies fell by and large below the 
potential. Hungary appeared to be the most open of the CEEC’s with the actual trade with market 
economies reaching 30% of the potential. Unfortunately, Wang and Winters did not estimate the 
potential trade for Yugoslavia, but one can  assume, on a basis of other studies, that Yugoslavia 
(Croatia) suffered from less trade bias than other CEEC’s. 
 
Baldwin’s (1994) results for the last pre-transition year 1989 confirmed that there was too much intra-
CEEC trade. The extent of trade diversion varied from 160% of excess trade with the East for 
Romania to 40% for Poland. Potential CEE exports to EU-12 were 4,8 times higher than the actual, 
while the potential EU-12 exports to CEEC’s were 2,1 times higher than the actual. Although Croatia 
was at that time still a part of Yugoslavia, which prevented comparison of potential with actual values, 
Baldwin has also estimated a pattern of potential Croatian exports. According to these estimates, the 
EC-12 should in the long run become the destination for around 60% of Croatian exports. If exports to 
EFTA-6 are also added, this increases the share to 76%. 
 
In addition, Baldwin presents the projection of trade pattern in the scenario of partial income catch-up. 
Although the effects of the partial income catch-up would make the trade amongst the CEEC’s remain 
important, trade with the Western Europe will become dominant with the trade share ranging for 
different countries between 50% and 70%. 
 
Even though different studies come to different quantitative conclusions with respect to the intra-
CEEC trade, they all agree that prior to the collapse of the CMEA there existed a large potential for an 
increase in trade with the Western countries. The main reason behind the different estimates, apart   4
from the differences in the estimation methods, samples and periods for which the simulation 
exercises were run, lies in the great uncertainty about the exact values of the relevant variables. This is 
especially true for the GDP of the CEEC’s and the value of trade flows that existed amongst them, 
estimates of which varied a great deal. 
 
Although trade reorientation that was caused by the CMEA collapse led to a slump in demand, it was 
not necessarily bad since it helped the convergence towards the “natural” patterns. Indeed, most of the 
CEEC’s recovered fairly quickly as their exports to the EU grew at double-digit rates. 
 
2.  The dissolution  of the supranational states left the inheritance of large home country biases in 
trade structure amongst the successor states. Even if the impact of the war that followed the Croatian 
separation from Yugoslavia is neglected, the emergence of the borders, dividing previously united 
economic area necessarily leads to a decrease in the level of trade between the newly independent 
countries. In other words, a division of a country decreases home bias that existed in trade, although it 
usually takes a long period of time before the effect fully takes place. One can observe wide spectrum 
of opinions with respect to reasons that lead to the fall in trade. While Djankov and Freund (2000) 
consider home-bias to be mostly a result of tariffs and endogenous historical developments which are 
specific for each country (e.g. the development of the transport network and other infrastructure, 
production and consumption chains, and business networks), other researchers add a number of other 
reasons. Rose (2000) points to the r ole that common currency has in promoting trade amongst 
countries (some of the most obvious reasons are disappearance of the costs of exchange as well as 
exchange rate uncertainty). One also has to take into account the costs of acquiring information, which 
increases when one is doing business over the border (see, for example, Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000). 
 
Classical case of separation is the incidence of Austro-Hungarian Empire break-up in 1919 (de Ménil 
and Maurel). According to their estimates, five years after the break-up trade decreased to 60% of the 
pre-war level, which was still four times more than what would have been expected according to the 
gravity model. 
 
Contemporary estimates of home country bias in trade for high-income economies vary across 
countries as well as across different studies. McCallum (1995), pioneering the area, estimated the bias 
for Canada using the 1988 data for provinces. He shows that Canadian provinces, after controlling for 
size and income, used to trade 22 times more amongst themselves than with US federal states. Later 
studies present somewhat lower estimates. Helliwell (1998) found that during the period 1993-96 
Canadian provinces traded 12 times more between themselves than with US federal states. Wei (1996) 
estimated home trade biases for a number of countries. The average value of bias for an OECD 
country during the period 1982-94, after controlling for a number of possibly important factors   5
(adjacency, remoteness, language), was about 2.3, which is much smaller than the previous estimates. 
However, this still means that national borders play an important role in directing trade flows. The 
estimated home country bias showed a great deal of variation through the sample - USA exhibited the 
smallest bias of only 1.4, while Portugal exhibited highest with internal trade exceeding external by 
the factor of 5.7. 
 
One cannot look at the home country bias without taking into account the level of openness, which 
represents the other side of the coin. Since larger countries have a natural tendency to trade less with 
abroad, in comparison to smaller countries, it is possible to overcame shortcomings of the simple trade 
openness ratio (TOR) by looking at the home country bias in trade. 
 
The secession, quite naturally, increases the level of openness of the country because it turns 
previously domestic trade into foreign trade. However, due to a decrease in home country bias, it is 
quite possible that the post-secession foreign trade separation is smaller than total trade that a country 
previously conducted, both domestic and foreign. 
 
3.  Before the transition started, except for trade flows that existed amongst them, transition countries 
were relatively closed economies. This was a consequence of restrictions that central planning 
imposed, and of the planner’s aspirations to insulate the country from influences of the world 
economy. One of the manifestations of that phenomenon was rather high home country bias, estimated 
for the successor states. 
 
Former Yugoslavia was, by international standards, not an exception to this rule, although some of the 
studies mentioned suggest that the quantity of trade distortions in Croatia was lower in comparison to 
other transition countries. The share of merchandise exports and imports in GDP in 1987, five years 
prior to the break-up, was less than 40% (World Development Report, 1989). Croatia, accounted for a 
quarter of Yugoslavian GDP (Sirotkovic, 1996). The data from the 1987 input-output tables reveal that 
Croatian trade with former Republics was more than two times larger than overall foreign trade. 
Although detailed estimates of the home country bias in trade for former Yugoslavia are not available, 
from this figure one can guess that trade amongst the former Yugoslav Republics exceeded trade with 
other countries by a high multiple even after controlling for factors such as income and distance. 
Abundant foreign trade regulations that existed together with control over foreign exchange were the 
main impediments to larger foreign trade. 
 
Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc (2000) present a partial piece of evidence on the size of home country bias in 
former Yugoslavia. According to their study, the level of trade between Slovenia and Croatia in 1990, 
prior to the break-up, exceeded the normal level 24 times. This figure is rather high in comparison to   6
the above-mentioned estimates of home country biases that are present in high-income countries, but 
low in comparison to other transition countries. For example, according to the same study, trade flows 
amongst the three groups of newly independent countries: former Republics of the Czechoslovakia, 
Baltic States and the Belarus-Russia-Ukraine exceeded the normal by 41-43 times. Even a number of 
years after the separation (in 1998), the levels of trade still surpassed the effect of PTA’s that replaced 
unitary states. The level of trade between Croatia and Slovenia exceeded the “normal” two times, 
between the Czech and the Slovak Republics it was seven times, 13 times between the Baltic states 
and 30 times between Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. 
 
Havrylyshyn (1998) showed that countries that have made the most progress in structural reforms have 
also gone farthest in diversifying their exports to new destinations - at least regarding the EU. This 
points to the fact that there is a correlation between domestic policies and the convergence of actual 
and potential trade structure. The second regularity observed by Havrylyshyn is the relationship 
between the progress of reforms and the level of openness. This is in concordance with the predictions 
based on gravity equations and assumed impediments to trade that were present before the reforms 
took place. 
 
In addition to the three issues mentioned above, which affect trade in more or less unambiguous 
manner, GDP growth also plays an important role in driving the quantities of international trade and 
the levels of openness. Those countries that grow faster end up trading more both in volumes and as a 
share of GDP. Others, less fortunate, may turn out to have lower trade shares and volumes. 
 
 
2. Croatia: A Somewhat Different Story 
 
At the time of the declaration of independence, with the TOR being as high as 88%, Croatia was an 
open economy, much more open than former Yugoslavia ever was. Considering the above-mentioned 
determinants of trade that were expected to increase Croatia’s trade integration with the EU and other 
developed economies, as well as to further decrease a modest (e.g. in comparison with 1987) share of 
trade with former Yugoslav Republics, one would have anticipated further increase in the level of 
openness. Yet, contrary to the expectations, quite the opposite happened. In 1993, exactly a year after 
Croatia became independent, TOR sharply decreased to 78%. The fall continued in the 1994, when 
TOR declined further to 66%. With the exception of 1997, during which a higher than average imports 
growth temporarily increased openness, a general declining trend continued until the end of the 
decade. It was only in 2000 when TOR increased due to the higher exports. 
 






















































TOR w/o former Republics
 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Monthly Statistical Report, various issues 
 
 
It has to be noted that the sharp fall in the TOR was not a result of a decrease in trade with former 
Republics of Yugoslavia. If one looks at the TOR without taking them into account, a similar 
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Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Monthly Statistical Report, various issues 
 
How can this unusual decline in TOR be explained? Especially having in mind that Croatia, according 
to the most commonly used indicators (e.g. EBRD), belongs to the group of advanced transition 
economies, i.e. those countries that are, according to the findings in Havrylyshyn (1998), supposed to 
make the most progress in opening-up and diversifying their trade? Not only that the TOR did not 
increase, but the, regional structure of Croatian trade also didn’t change as one would have expected. 
After the declaration of the independence, the share of trade with the EU-15 was 57%, or pretty much 
the same as eight years later. It can be noticed that trade share of countries constituting CEFTA at the   8
same time fell from 23% to 14%. Most of this fall was compensated for by increase in trade with other 
former Yugoslav Republics Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia after the end of the war in 1995. 
 
 












Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Monthly Statistical Report, various issues 
So, what are the likely reasons behind the observed fall in openness and stagnant trade structure? In 
1993, and 1994, the main reason for the rapid decline in the TOR was break-up of trade links with 
former Yugoslav republics, as can be seen from the Figure 1 which demonstrates that the decline in 
TOR was much slower excluding the former YU republics. However, even excluding them, TOR 
recorded falling trend. The main explanation, along the reasons mentioned in (Vujcic, Presecan, 1999) 
was the exclusion of Croatia from trade associations in the region. Croatia did not have an association 
agreement with the EU, was not a member of the CEFTA, and did not even have a bilateral trade 
agreements with its main trading partners except for the bilateral free trade agreements with Slovenia 
and Macedonia, which are in force since January 1998, and October 1997, respectively. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was a first country with which FTA agreement was signed, but was first broken in 1998
3, 
and then renewed on an asymmetrical basis in January 2001. Until mid-2001 Croatia was not even a 
member of the WTO (see Table 8 in Appendix). These were all huge impediments to trade 
development and increase in the TOR). 
 
3. How does the Croatia fit into the region? 
 
After looking at the dynamics of the Croatian trade during the 1990’s, we address the question of the 
present level of Croatian integration with the SouthEast Europe (SEE) and tackle the issue of its future 
development. The intra-regional trade share of the SEE-5 countries in 1993 stood at 5.3%. This share 
increased once the war was over in 1995. In 1997 it reached the level of 10.2% and then stagnated 
afterwards. The increase was mostly at the expense of CEFTA countries, whose share decreased, while 
                                                                 
3 Because of the IMF insistence on higher tariff  revenues for Bosnia and Hercegovina   9
the trade share of the EU countries remained practically unchanged. Croatia, accounting for over half 
of total trade of the region and, well above the third of intra-regional trade, was the principal force 
giving the impulse to growing integration amongst the countries in the region. 
 


















Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, 2000 
 
Taking into account the fact that, for example, share of trading conducted within the grouping of the 
Benelux countries, a highly integrated, and economically much larger region, was 13% (Flörkemeier, 
2001), a share of 10% for a much smaller and less integrated SEE-5 group seems to be quite high. 
Adjusting the intraregional trade shares by a measure of the region’s importance in the world trade 
gives a simple trade concentration ratios (or trade intensity ratios). This indicator shows to what 
degree the trade between the group of countries is concentrated amongst them. 
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Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, 2000 and author’s calculations 
   10 
There is a clear increasing trend in the trade concentration indicator for the SEE-5 countries reaching a 
value of 50 at the end of the analyzed period. This tells us that countries of the region traded amongst 
them 50 times more than to a typical country anywhere in the world. In order to compare the SEE 
countries with some of the well-established regional trading blocks, in Table 1 we present the same 
indicator for a number of regional trading blocks. 
 
Table 1: Trade Concentration Ratios for Different Regions 
  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
SEE-5  34.5  41.3  43.9  46.5  47.9  46.0  50.0 
APEC    1.6           
ASEAN-6    3.6           
EU-15    1.6           
EU-12    2.1           
Mercusor    12.8           
Andean Community    12.6           
NAFTA    2.2           
Source: Frankel (1997) 
 
It can be noticed that trade concentration ratios reveal much higher level of integration amongst the 
SEE countries in comparison to the existing trading blocks. Although the data on intraregional trade 
show that EU countries trade a lot between themselves, because of their size and importance in the 
world economy the level of actual trade concentration is much smaller in comparison to other trading 
blocks. Also, one has to be careful when comparing the absolute levels of trade concentration index 
for countries that differ in the level of development because more developed economies tend to export 
a wide variety of products and to better diversify their exports geographically (Flörkemeier, 2001). 
What is more surprising is a very high trade concentration level in the SEE countries even in 
comparison to smaller blocks such as Mercusor or the Andean Community. According to the trade 
concentration indices, the SEE-5 group seems to be very highly integrated. 
 
Trade concentration index controls for the level to which a country is integrated in to the world 
economy, which means that different country sizes and different levels of openness do not influence 
the result. This index, however, does not take into account the income and transportation costs effects. 
Moreover, it can compare across different levels of integration, but it cannot tell anything about the 
levels of trade creation and diversion that are created with the formation of trading blocks or the 
optimality of the trading structure. A bit more sophisticated gravity approach takes care of some of 
these problems. 
 
Gravity approach was launched as a more or less “atheoretical” approach to the analysis of trade 
flows. However, the idea of using economic potential and the cost of doing trade in an analysis of 
bilateral trade flows proved to be much more theoretically based than was thought at first. Frankel   11 
(1997) surveys a list of authors that tried to root gravity approach into different theoretical rationales, 
Hekscher-Ohlin model as well as the theory of imperfect substitutes. Theoretical foundations of the 
gravity approach also brought a few extensions to the model. A possibility of an inclusion of the 
“similarity” or “dissimilarity” variables to test for different trade theories is the prominent one. 
Although compatible with the range of trade theories, the gravity approach is unable to predict the 
composition of the goods that are supposed to be imported or exported by a country. One has to look 
at the underlying theory of trade in order to obtain an answer to that question. 
 
Gravity model is usually estimated over a pool of countries for a number of years using a panel 
approach. However, because we are solely interested in the pattern of Croatian trade, we rely on a 
single-country equation. Gravity equation that we estimate, in its simplest form, is the following one: 
 
TRi=ß0+ ß1GDPi+ ß2DISTi+S?kDik         
 
where TRi stands for the natural logarithm of Croatian trade with country i, GDPi for the natural 
logarithm of the gross domestic product of the country i, m easured at exchange rate parity (World 
Bank, 2000) and DISTi for the distance between the Zagreb and the capital of the country  i. D ik 
represents a number of different dummies; adjacency, common history and trade preferential. 
 
Single-country specification, except for serving well our purpose, also avoids some troubling 
specification problems that arise in pooled estimates. In the later case, differences in relative 
remoteness of trading partners produce systemic biases that depend on the location of a specific 
country (Brenton and Di Mauro, 1998). Furthermore, the issue of heterogeneity of the countries may 
also be alleviated with single-country specification. 
 
Table 2 presents estimates of the gravity equations. All estimates refer to 1999, the latest year for 
which we could get a full coverage of trade and GDP data. Two different sets of observations were 
used: European countries (N=42) for which road distances were used and all Croatian trading partners 
(N=151) for which air distances were used. These two sets were complemented with three different 
dummy variables: adjacency, language (for members of the former Yugoslavia) and FTA for countries 
with which Croatia has a preferential trade agreement. Dummy variables were not used simultaneously 
because they appear to be highly collinear, but rather included one-by-one. This gives a total of 12 
regressions.  A number of other variables were also included, like measures of similarity or 
dissimilarity to trading partners. None of the two fared quite well, not being significant at the level of 
10%. This means that neither the Linder nor the Hekscher-Ohlin effect could be traced in those gravity 
specifications. A GDP per capita variable, complementing the nominal GDP as a measure of the level 
of development / size, was also included. However, the variable appeared to be significant only in the   12 
second set of equations, after the effects of common history have been dummied out. This brings a 
number of estimated equations to the total of 14. 
 
Table 2 Gravity equations for Croatia - Aggregate trade flows 
  1  2  3  4  5  6   
const  9.02  8.36  4.25    3.48     
  (2.7)  (2.0)  (1.0)    (0.9)     
GDP  0.93  0.93  1.01  1.09  1.02  1.10   
  (7.6)  (7.5)  (8.0)  (11.5)  (8.5)  (12.2)   
dist_car  -2.11  -2.02  -1.64  -1.26  -1.58  -1.28   
  (-5.8)  (-4.2)  (-3.7)  (-5.4)  (-3.9)  (-5.7)   
border    0.28           
    (0.3)           
language      1.89  2.59     
      (1.7)  (3.1)     
FTA        2.76  3.35   
        (2.5)  (3.7)   
           
N  42  42  42  42  42  42   
R2 - adj  0.68  0.67  0.70  0.70  0.72  0.72   
           
           
  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14 
const  3.17  1.96  1.10    1.09   
  (1.7)  (1.0)  (0.5)    (0.5)   
GDP  0.91  0.92  0.94  0.97  0.91  0.94  0.97  0.92 
  (12.8)  (12.9)  (13.3)  (20.2)  (15.8)  (13.4)  (20.6)  (16.1) 
GDPpc          0.18      0.17 
          (1.6)      (1.5) 
dist_air  -1.27  -1.14  -1.08  -1.01  -0.92  -1.09  -1.01  -0.93 
  (-8.1)  (-6.4)  (-6.3)  (-10.4)  (-8.3)  (-6.5)  (-10.6)  (-8.5) 
border    1.58           
    1.62           
language      2.65  2.88  3.08     
      (2.5)  (3.0)  (3.2)     
FTA          3.34  3.57  3.73 
          (2.8)  (3.3)  (3.4) 
           
N  147  147  147  147  147  147  147  147 
R2 - adj  0.65  0.66  0.67  0.67  0.67  0.67  0.67  0.68 
t - values in parenthesis 
 
GDP and distance variables are found to be significant in all fourteen specifications. Moreover, the 
coefficient with the GDP variable is around one in all of them, except for the specifications including 
the GDP per capita variable, where the sum of the two parameters has to be taken into account. The 
parameter on the distance variable, which is also significant in all equations, although pointing in the 
right direction, shows a bit more variability, depending on the selection of a dummy variable and the 
inclusion of the constant term. The overall level of explained variation is quite satisfactory, with the 
adjusted coefficient of determination ranging from 66% to 72%, which is a standard in the empirical 
gravity-model literature. The overall level of fit was a bit better for the smaller sample, probably   13 
representing the fact that the land distance variable makes more sense as a proxy for costs of doing 
trade than the air distance. 
 
The only dummy variable that is not significant is the one representing the adjacency. This reflects a 
variety of the countries surrounding Croatia. The “language” dummy representing the set of the former 
Republics fared much better. It is estimated that belonging to the former Yugoslavia increases bilateral 
trade flows between six and a half (equation 3: exp(1.89)=6.6) and almost twenty-two (equation 11: 
exp(3.08)=21.8) times over the “normal” level. The “benchmark” level is the Croatian trade with all 
other trading partners, taking care of the sample choice, of course. Three of the former republics had a 
PTA with Croatia in 1999. Because the two effects are intertwined, it is impossible to plausibly 
separate between them. Moreover, except for the trade agreement, the PTA dummy also represents a 
fact that there was no conflict with Slovenia and Macedonia, which is partially true even for Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, as opposed to Yugoslavia with which the trade was almost non-existent for most of 
the analyzed period. However, when only the dummy representing a PTA is included into the 
equation, its estimated effect on bilateral trade ranged between 15 times (equation 5: exp(2.76)=15.8) 
and 41 times (equation 14: exp(3.73)=40.9 ). The estimated size of the common language / history / 
PTA effects is amazing, which makes us believe that a very large share of these effects can be 
explained by the home-bias leftovers. These findings confirm the conclusions we reached by looking 
at the simpler trade concentration indices. 
 
This could be ascribed to the links established prior to the break-up as well as to the liberal trade 
policies afterwards (existence of the PTA’s). At the same time Croatia was excluded from closer trade 
integration with the EU and CEFTA countries as well as from the WTO membership .In other words 
by the political feasibility at trade relations, it was directed to trade with ex-Yu countries. 
 
After describing basic properties of the estimated models, we compare the actual and estimated 
“potential” trade structures for different regions. This comparison is presented in Table 3. The most 
noticeable is the fact that actual Croatian trade conducted within the SEE-5 region is above the 
potential according to all estimates, regardless of the specification and even after the common 
language and PTA effects have been dummied out. Estimated trade potentials with the EU and 
CEFTA reveal the other side of the same coin. According to most estimates of the first set of 
equations, Croatian trade is still to a large degree biased away from the EU countries and even more 
from the CEFTA countries. According to the second set of equations, Croatian trade with the EU is 
“above” normal. However, the excess of trade with the EU is with the respect to the CEFTA and non-
European countries and not in comparison to the SEE countries. This may, at least in part, be due to 
the misrepresentation of the trading costs with the air distance variable.  
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Table 3: The Ratio of Croatian Actual Trade to Trade Potential 
Actual Trade - Potential Trade (USD millions) 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
SEE  636  608 249  196  527  542  769
EU  -616  -644 108  -646  -74  -898  422
CEFTA  -1,288  -1,429 -2,395  -1,376  -5,944  -4,597  865
           
  8  9  10  11  12  13  14 
SEE  628  268 253  320  495  499  534
EU  83  1,812 1,901  1,409  1,718  1,784  1,292
CEFTA  83  -512 -392  -865  -2,370  -2,227  -2,957
               
Actual Trade / Potential Trade 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
SEE  410%  360% 142%  130%  267%  281%  1154%
EU  91%  91% 102%  91%  99%  88%  107%
CEFTA  56%  54% 41%  54%  22%  27%  209%
               
  8  9  10  11  12  13  14 
SEE  394%  147% 143%  161%  243%  246%  273%
EU  105%  139% 142%  128%  136%  138%  125%
CEFTA  105%  76% 81%  66%  41%  43%  36%
 
A very large trade potential estimated to lie with the CEFTA countries is mostly, although not 
exclusively, confined to Slovenia. This is the result of the dominance of the home bias in trade with 




4. A Look into the Crystal Ball 
 
How wills the future development of aggregate trade flows look like? In order to speculate about that, 
we have to make certain assumptions about the forces that will shape Croatia's trade pattern tomorrow. 
The gravity approach confirmed an initial conjecture that Croatia was leaning against the forces of the 
trade diversification most of the time after the declaration of the independence. This was mainly due to 
its exclusion from trade arrangements with the EU, CEFTA, and the WTO. We believe that it is 
rational to expect more rapid trade diversification in the future due to the inclusion of Croatia into the 
main trade arrangements with the EU, CEFTA as well as an entry into the WTO. Further trade 
diversification could also be expected because of the continuing decrease in the home bias observed in 
the post break-up countries. Furthermore, an expected speeding up of the reforms in Croatia as well as 
in other countries of the region should also contribute towards the same result (Havrylyshyn, 1998). 
All of the forces mentioned should decrease the intraregional trade share. On the other side, if the 
countries in the region are to catch-up to the EU, relative difference in growth rates of these countries 
vis-a-vis other countries should lead to an increase of the intraregional trade share. The actual outcome 
will depend on the interplay of these effects and their actual intensity.   15 
 
We have used the estimated gravity models in order to project the future pattern of the Croatian trade 
in year 2010. These projections are based on the following assumptions. First, we assume the SEE 
countries to grow at the annual rate of 5%. The assumed growth rate of the CEFTA region, as well as 
that of Croatia (since Croatia has higher GDP per capita than the SEE countries, comparable to 
countries belonging to the CEFTA region) is 4%, while we expect the EU to grow at the rate of 2,5%. 
The projected growth rate's therefore presume a partial income catch-up. On the basis of the current 
trends, we believe that the assumption of the Croatian PTA with the EU and CEFTA countries as well 
as amongst the SEE countries is realistic. Finally, we have to deal with the quantitative effects of these 
PTA’s. As we have already mentioned, in our gravity model the effects of PTA are intertwined with 
the cultural effects. However, we assume the common culture to increase trade by tenfold, with the 
exception of Slovenia where diversification has gone farthest, where we assume the culture to double 
trade. This is based on the results from Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc (2000). Obviously, the assumptions on 
the leftovers of home country bias in trade are highly present in our projections and that should be kept 
in mind when interpreting the results. The inclusion of Croatia in the PTA with the EU, CEFTA and 
SEE countries is assumed to increase trade by 35% in all scenarios, which is roughly similar to the 
numbers found in other studies (Frankel, 1997). However, this is much smaller than the 97% - 123% 
range that is obtained by simply dividing the “PTA” and “Language” dummies in comparable 
specifications. Finally, the coefficients on the GDP, GDP per capita and distance variables are taken 
from the equations 6, 13 and 14, which give the best fit in their class. Three different selections of 
parameters give three different scenarios of trade developments. 
 
Table 4: Projected trade growth rates 
  Projection 1  Projection 2  Projection 3 
SEE  54.3%  -2.4%  144.8% 
EU  107.1%  27.5%  350.2% 
CEFTA  112.1%  16.3%  249.6% 
 
According to these projections, the largest trade potential for Croatia clearly lies with the EU and 
CEFTA countries. Although according to different specifications there is a large degree of variation in 
magnitude of projected growth rates, there is a little change in the ordering. 
 
 
5. Sectoral Gravity Equations 
 
In this section we address the question of sectoral composition of Croatian trade. After presenting 
stylized data on trade structure, we run sectoral gravity equations. In principle, these equations can 
give us an insight into the sectoral effects of PTA’s and shed more light on the actual positioning of   16 
trade potentials with respect to the EU. Furthermore, estimated coefficients, especially the income 
elasticity of trade should reveal the sectors with the high potential of growth in the catch-up scenario. 
 
In tables 5 and 6 we present the sectoral breakdown of merchandise exports and imports. This type of 
breakdown that focuses on the “sensitive” and other commodities is taken from Vittas and Mauro 
(1997). The actual trade flows are compiled from the SITC database with the high level of 





Table 5: Sectoral composition of the Croatian merchandise exports - 1999 
   Of 
which: 
         



















33.9%  20.5%  4.6%  5.8%    60.6%  13.7%  17.2% 
0 (Food and live 
animals) 
6.8%  1.1%  1.7%  3.2%    16.8%  25.5%  46.8% 
5 (Chemicals) 
 
12.0%  5.8%  2.3%  2.0%    48.9%  19.1%  16.9% 
67 (Iron and steel) 
 
1.0%  0.6%  0.1%  0.2%    59.6%  13.2%  21.0% 
65 (Textile yarn and 
fabrics) 
1.9%  1.4%  0.2%  0.2%    71.5%  8.0%  10.5% 
84 (Clothing) 
 
12.2%  11.6%  0.3%  0.2%    94.8%  2.8%  1.8% 
                 
Other commodities 
 
66.1%  28.5%  8.9%  9.2%    43.1%  13.4%  13.9% 
2 (Nonfuel crude 
materials) 
5.6%  4.3%  1.0%  0.2%    76.1%  17.1%  2.9% 
3 (Fuels, etc) 
 
7.9%  2.1%  3.1%  2.1%    26.3%  39.6%  26.2% 
7 (Machines and 
transport equipment) 
29.3%  9.2%  1.6%  1.6%    31.5%  5.6%  5.3% 
8-84 (Misc. 
Manufactured Goods) 
10.2%  7.6%  0.7%  1.3%    73.9%  7.0%  12.9% 
6-65-67 (Other Basic 
Manuf.) 
6.9%  3.0%  1.3%  2.0%    43.4%  18.7%  29.0% 
Other 
 
6.2%  2.3%  1.2%  2.1%    38.0%  18.7%  34.3% 
                 
Total  100.0%  49.0%  13.5%  15.0%    49.0%  13.5%  15.0% 
 
Around one third of the Croatian merchandise exports in 1999 fell within the category of sensitive 
goods. While half of the Croatian exports were directed towards the EU, the share of the EU in exports 
of “sensitive” sectors was higher than 60%. This means that around 42% of Croatian exports to the EU   17 
fell within the group of “sensitive” compared to 26% of exports to countries other than the EU. Share 
of “sensitive” commodities in the EU imports from Croatia was at the higher end of the range of these 
imports coming from the CEEC’s at the time of signing of the European agreements. 
 
Major items in the group of “sensitive” exports were food and live animals (0), clothing (84) and 
chemicals (5). While the exports of food and live animals were oriented towards the SEE countries, 
the exports of clothing showed a remarkably high degree of penetration to the EU market. 
The imports of “sensitive sectors” goods constituted a bit more than a quarter of all Croatian imports. 
It is interesting to note that the share of imports from the EU in these sectors was quite similar to the 
share of the EU in the exports of the same commodities. Having in mind that Croatian merchandise 
imports in 1999 were 81,7% higher than the merchandise exports, the imports of “sensitive” goods 
from the EU surpassed exports by 35.9%. Therefore, Croatia does not have a revealed comparative 
advantage in the “sensitive” commodities with respect to the EU. 
 
Table 6: Sectoral composition of the Croatian merchandise imports 
    Of 
which: 
           
 Percent of 
total 












26.7%  15.4%  5.8%  0.6%    57.6%  21.6%  2.3% 
0 (Food and live 
animals) 
7.2%  3.3%  1.9%  0.3%    46.4%  25.9%  3.6% 
5 (Chemicals) 
 
12.1%  7.3%  2.3%  0.1%    60.7%  18.8%  1.1% 
67 (Iron and steel) 
 
2.7%  1.4%  1.0%  0.2%    50.1%  36.2%  6.4% 
65 (Textile yarn and 
fabrics) 
2.1%  1.3%  0.4%  0.0%    61.6%  18.2%  2.1% 
84 (Clothing) 
 
2.7%  2.1%  0.3%  0.0%    78.1%  10.5%  0.6% 
                 
Other commodities 
 
73.3%  41.2%  8.1%  1.8%    56.2%  11.0%  2.5% 
2 (Nonfuel crude 
materials) 
2.2%  0.9%  0.4%  0.3%    38.8%  17.0%  12.4% 
3 (Fuels, etc) 
 
11.0%  0.9%  0.4%  0.1%    8.0%  3.3%  1.3% 
7 (Machines and 
transport equipment) 
35.0%  22.9%  2.7%  0.4%    65.3%  7.7%  1.0% 
8-84 (Misc. 
Manufactured Goods) 
9.1%  6.2%  1.4%  0.1%    67.9%  14.9%  1.6% 
6-65-67 (Other Basic 
Manuf.) 
6.6%  4.0%  2.1%  0.1%    59.9%  32.3%  1.1% 
Other 
 
9.3%  6.4%  1.2%  0.8%    69.2%  12.4%  9.0% 
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In Table 7 we present the results of the sectoral gravity models. We have included the same set of 
variables that we have used in the gravity equation of the aggregate flows. The only exception are the 
regional dummies, where we restrict ourselves to the use of the PTA dummy only since the adjacency 
and language dummies did not work as well in the aggregate gravity model. 
 
Table 7: Sectoral gravity equations 
Sensitive Commodities 
  0  5  65  67  84 
const           
           
GDP  0.72  1.01  0.81  1.09  0.83 
  (9.9)  (13.4)  (13.4)  (9.9)  (10.0) 
dist_air  -0.79  -1.47  -1.18  -1.97  -1.32 
  (-5.0)  (-8.8)  (-8.6)  (-7.6)  (-7.1) 
PTA  4.33  3.50  3.07  3.50  3.40 
  (3.1)  (2.7)  (3.1)  (2.5)  (2.4) 
           
N  103  94  79  63  82 
R2 - adj  0.41  0.59  0.64  0.54  0.51 
 
Other Commodities 
  2  3  6-65-67  7  8-84 
const    13.16      -5.29 
    (3.43)      (-2.6) 
GDP  0.72  0.39  0.43  0.89  1.15 
  (10.6)  (2.4)  (16.5)  (12.7)  (13.8) 
dist_air  -0.94  -1.90  -0.61  -1.04  -1.19 
  (-6.30)  (-5.99)  (-10.93)  (-6.97)  (-7.20) 
PTA  3.50    1.80  3.007652  4.71 
  (2.9)    (3.5)  (2.1)  (4.2) 
           
N  92  72  109  116  104 
R2 - adj  0.49  0.41  0.66  0.54  0.74 
t - values in parenthesis 
 
In terms of the coefficients of determination, most equations perform quite well, with the adjusted R
2 
falling within the 0.5 to 0.75 range. The exceptions are equations for food and live animal's (0) and 
fuels (3). Fuels, however, are known to perform badly within the gravity framework because trade in 
natural resources depends on endowments rather then production. 
 
The regional dummy performs quite well across different specifications, meaning that existing trade 
biases are not confined to some sector but rather widely distributed. The largest trade diversion 
towards the three countries constituting the PTA with Croatia is found in miscellaneous manufactured 
goods, except clothing (8-84) where the dummy suggests trade 110 times higher than the “normal” and 
food and live animals where the trade is 75 times higher than the normal. This may be one of the 
reasons for rather poor performance of gravity equation for that sector. It is interesting to note that bias   19 
that exists in trade with former Yu - Republics is germane to “sensitive” goods as well as to other 
goods. Any systematic deviation on the basis of belonging to a certain product group was not found. 
 
 
6. Croatian trade structure and FDI 
 
From the theoretical point of view link between the trade and FDI is ambiguous. On the one hand, 
moving part of the production into the host country may displace some of the exports from the source 
country. This refers to so called “horizontal” FDI. On the other hand, FDI flows may facilitate trade if 
they are connected with the outsourcing of the production process and exporting components, which is 
usually called “vertical” FDI. Although few FDIs can be directly observed as “vertical”, most 
empirical evidence confirms the thesis that trade and FDI behave as complements, both in the 
transition countries and worldwide (Frankel, 1997; Brenton, di Mauro and Lücke, 1998). In cited 
studies the parameters on FDI flows are high and significant, validating the “vertical” FDI argument. 
However, the direction of the causality is still unclear. 
 
In terms of a cumulative per capita FDIs Croatia did well compared with advanced transition countries 
and much better than the slower reformers. According to the empirical evidence available, this should 
result in higher than expected involvement of Croatia in foreign trade. Also, at first glance, it may 
seem that Croatia invalidates the argument of “domino FDI” (Brenton, di Mauro and Lücke, 1998) – it 
performs much better in FDI terms than some of the accession countries in spite of being left out of 
the EU enlargement process. 
 
Table 7: Cumulative per capita FDI 1994 – IX 2001 (USD) 
Czech Republic   2,296.99 
Hungary  1,789.81 
Croatia  1,290.00 
Poland  1,085.85 
Slovenia  907.58 
Slovakia   901.30 
Bulgaria  451.32 
Romania  325.19 
Source: Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook 2001; International Financial Statistics, Volume 
LIV, Number 5, May 2001 
 
However, testing the relationship between trade and cumulative FDI flows in the context of gravity 
equation fails to provide a proof of positive link between trade and FDI in Croatia. The parameter on 
log of cumulative FDI flows is low, negative in sign and insignificant in comparison to other variables 
included - opposite of what one would have normally expected. Therefore, we might conclude that 
FDI in Croatia did not play trade-enhancing role as it usually does.   20 
 
Table 8: Gravity equation augmented with cumulative FDI flows 
GDP  0.81 
  (0.08) 
DIST_AIR  -0.48 
  (0.19) 
FDISUM99  -0.12 
  (0.10) 
FTA  3.24 
  (0.71) 
   
R-squared  0.57 
N  27 
 
It seems that Croatia sets a surprising counter-evidence to the established empirical literature on trade 
and FDI links. This apparent anomaly can, however, be explained by the sectoral FDI structure. Most 
FDIs in Croatia are concentrated in non-tradable services sectors (telecommunications, financial and 
tourism sectors
4) and manufacturing sectors that mainly depend on the domestic market (production of 
cement, bricks, beer, ...). This means that despite high level of FDI, investment in trade-promoting 
activities avoided Croatia, complying with the “domino FDI” theory. A consequence of the "non-
export" sectoral distribution of FDIs in Croatia was a poor export performance in comparison to 
comparable transition countries where FDI flows were much more inclined towards export industries. 
 
Table 9: Structure of foreign direct equity investment in Croatia by activity 1993-2001 
Telecommunications  29.37 
Other monetary intermediation  17.26 
Manufacture of pharmaceutical preparations  15.41 
Manufacture of cement  5.05 
Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas  3.11 
Hotels and motels, with restaurant  2.66 
Other wholesale  1.67 
Manufacture of bricks, tiles and construction prod  1.53 
Manufacture of beer  1.35 
Manufacture of television and radio transmitters  1.11 
   
Other  21.47 
   
Total  100.00  
Source: Croatian National Bank www.hnb.hr 
 
The observed trade and FDI developments in Croatia confirm that exclusion from political and trade 
integration processes damages economy in various ways. 
 
                                                                 
4 The tourism sector, in fact, is a tradable one, but not treated as such in the above gravity equation since only 
manufacturing trade is included. Inclusion of tourism in gravity equations is a possible direction for a further 
research. That will particularly become important in the future, as more FDIs will flow into that sector, and as/if 
it further grows as a share of total (non-service and service) trade.   21 
 
7. Where Does the Croatia Belong? 
 
An answer to that question is important because the design of the “Right” trade system can accelerate 
the convergence process. Often, approaches are used that rely on the actual trade flows in an attempt to 
identify the “functional” regions from the trade perspective. However, this approach is, due to some 
stubborn historical links and complete disregard of the trade potentials, misleading if one seeks the 
trade regime that would facilitate trade and growth. 
 
An obvious conclusion from our gravity analysis is that the largest trade potential for Croatia lies with 
the EU and CEFTA countries. In terms of the trade system design it is, therefore, desirable that any 
further trade liberalization of trade with the SEE countries should be preceded/accompanied by trade 
liberalization with the EU and CEFTA countries. Right sequencing of trade liberalization will 
eliminate current trade biases and contribute most towards realizing potential trade growth. 
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No 1992 No Yes Slovak R,
Slovenia
March 1993 No No February 1998 November
1995 13
Hungary January 1995 March 1993 1989 No Yes
Israel
Croatia




No 1992 No Yes
Slovak R,
Slovenia
February 1993 No No February 1998 October 1995 5
Lithuania May 2000 No 1992 No Yes Slovenia February 1994 No No February 1994
December
1995 5
Poland July 1995 March 1993 1989 No Yes … December 1989 No March 1992 February 1995 April 1994 11
Romania January 1995 July 1997 1991 No Yes
Czech R,
Slovak R
May 1991 No May 1993 February 1995 June 1995 5






















1/ Data refers to when agreement came into force.
2/ As of July 2000.
3/ The Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic have a customs union agreement.
4/ The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR) signed a Trade and Cooperation Agreement in May 1990, PHARE in 1990 and an Association Agreement in December 1991. Following the dissolution of the CSFR, separate Association Agreements and suplementary proto e Cze
to the Interim Agreement were signed with each of the successor republics.  